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A more desirable solution would require revision of the tolling provisions in the
light of modem procedural methods. The New York tolling provision has been
amended to provide that the statute of limitations will run if the defendant has designated "in pursuance of law ....a resident of the state on whom a summons may be
served. ''2z Although this section applies to persons and corporations, it does not seem
to be sufficiently specific, for the New York court has held, in a non-resident driver2
case, that the agent must be one voluntarily appointed and not one named by statute
Taxation-Tax on Apple Growers-Use of Proceeds for Advertising of State-grown
Apples-[Michigan].-In i939 the State of Michigan, anxious to promote the sale of
home-grown apples, passed the "Baldwin Apple Act" providing for a tax upon the
producers of Michigan apples, the proceeds from which were to be used to set up a
commission with the sole task of advertising Michigan apples., The complainant,
representative of a group of disgruntled apple growers, sought to enjoin enforcement of
the statute on the ground that it was an unconstitutional discrimination and that it
was, in addition, a tax levied for a private rather than a public purpose. The lower
court upheld these contentions. On appeal by the state to the Michigan Supreme
Court, held, that the singling out of apple growers for the imposition of a specific
tax is not discriminatory and that apple growing in Michigan is an industry sufficiently
invested with a public interest to be the beneficiary of a tax. Judgment reversed. Miller
v. Michigan State Apple Corn'i.
The least troublesome of the issues concerns the power of the legislature to classify
for taxation purposes. The Michigan constitution authorizes specific taxes and provides only that they shall operate uniformly upon the class designated.3 There is no
question that the tax in the principal case operated uniformly upon the class of Michigan apple-growers.4 Moreover, the instances are infrequent in which a legislature's
classification for tax purposes has been the basis of invalidation.5 Michigan specific
taxes upon heirs,6 chain stores, 7 employment agencies, 8 drivers of vehicles,9 and sellers
of liquor xo have been declared constitutional.
2XN.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss, Supp. i94o) § ig.
-Maguire v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 253 App. Div. 249, i N.Y.S. (2d) 749 (1938), aff'd 278
N.Y. 576, 16 N.E. (2d) 110 (1938).
I Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, Supp. i94o) § 12.1220. The amount of the tax was one
cent upon each bushel or two cents upon each one hundred pounds, payable when shipped.
§ 12.1220(9).

N.W. 245 (Mich. 1941).
"The legislature may by law impose specific taxes, which shall be uniform upon the
classes upon which they operate." Mich. Const. art. 1o, §4.
4 Apples sold directly to cider and/or vinegar plants were exempt; each grower might produce three hundred bushels each year tax free. Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, Supp. 194o)
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7Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 259 N.W. 352 (I935).
8Brazee v. People of Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (igi6).

9Jasnowski v. Board of Assessors, 191 Mich. 287, 157 N.W. 891 (r916).
xoPeople v. Palasz, ig' Mich. 556, 158 N.W. 166 (i916).
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Since such class taxes have been declared constitutional, it is difficult to say that
the tax in the principal case is unconstitutional merely because the proceeds are earmarked for a special use. Proceeds from class taxes may, after going into the general
tax fund, be used for special purposes; earmarking should not invalidate the tax, for
taxes upon liquor sellers earmarked for a variety of special purposes are common" and
gasoline taxes for road-building have been levied.12
Since the tax in the instant case will, if the advertising scheme is successful, operate
to benefit apple growers immediately and the general public ultimately, the situation
is analogous to the public improvement cases in which the owners of abutting property
are the immediate beneficiiries and the general public the long-run beneficiaries. From
the standpoint of fiscal policy, an argument may be made for distributing the cost of
the advertising in the principal case between the apple growers and the public in proportion to the benefits received. This solution has been followed in the public improve3
ment cases.'
The more serious problem in the instant case is whether the benefit to the public
from such an advertising program is sufficient to justify the expenditure as one for
the public purpose. A Michigan statute authorizing a bond issue for the purpose of
aiding a railroad was declared unconstitutional as an expenditure for a private purpose,' 4 and subsidies to a factory,'s to manufacturers of sugar,' 6 and to a private association organized to improve the com crop17 were similarly held unconstitutional. In
other states, however, expenditures for railroads,' 8 for agricultural bureaus,'9 and for
2
the protection of stock raisers were sustained. 0
The inquiry in these cases is (i) whether or not the prosperity of the aided business
will peculiarly benefit the public, and (2) whether or not the aid granted will further
this benefit.21 In reaching an affirmative answer to the first inquiry the Michigan
court in the principal case appears to be tending toward the somewhat more liberal
" Conlon, Taxation in the Alcoholic Beverage Field, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 728, 745,
746 (1940).
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Special assessments have been levied upon the owners of abutting property, with the remainder of the funds coming from general tax money. Chicago v. Lord, 277 Ill. 397, ii5 N.E.
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543 (1917); People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419 (1851); Olson v. Watertown, 57 S.D. 363, 232 N.W. 289 (1930); Peoria v. Peoria R. Co., 274 Ill. 48, i3
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(1916).
14 People ex rel. Detroit and H. R. Co. v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870).
is Clee v. Sanders, 74 Mich. 692, 42 N.W. 154 (1889).
16Michigan Sugar Co. v. Auditor General, 124 Mich. 674, 83 N.W. 625 (19oo).
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1s Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853); Queensbury v. Culver, 19 Wall.

(U.S.) 83 (1873); State ex rel. Dickinson v. Neely, 30 S.C. 587, 9 S.E. 664 (1888); Olcott v.
Supervisors, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 678 (1872).
9 State ex rel. Hall County Farm Bureau v. Miller, 1o4 Neb. 838, 178 N.W. 846 (1920).
"0 Weaver v. Scurry County, 28 S.W. 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); Neal v. Boog-Scott, 247
S.W. 689 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).

" For an excellent discussion of the doctrine of public purpose applied to taxation, see
McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, 18 Calif. L. Rev. 137, 241

(1930).
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interpretation of the public purpose concept accepted in other states. The court undoubtedly was influenced by the fact that seven states expend money to advertise
their leading products under statutes similar to the one in question,22 and that none of
these statutes has been declared unconstitutional .' Moreover, the decline in the sale
of Michigan apples, partly because of state advertising campaigns carried on by Washington for apples and by Florida for citrus fruits, had its influence.24
Whether or not the aid proposed will operate to bring Michigan apple sales back to
"normal" and thus serve a public purpose (the second inquiry) is a question which the
court hurriedly answered in the affirmative.2s Actually, the end result of the advertising program is quite doubtful. If the Michigan apple advertising program is successful
and Michigan apples become established as a "super" brand, the economic effect will
be to increase the demand for Michigan apples at the expense of other kinds of apples,
other kinds of fruit, and apple substitutes.A There will probably be more extensive
advertising schemes by all states concerned, each tending to counteract the effect of
the other. The final result from Michigan's point of view is apt to be an apple market
approximately the same in size as at present with increased production costs because
27
of money spent for advertising.
In any long term sense, then, no benefit is apt to flow from this advertising pro-Idaho L. 1937, c. 252; Idaho L. 1939, c. 172; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp.
1940) §§ 2874, 6266; N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1940) c. 2B, §§ 556-(h, i); Me. Acts
& Res. 1937, c. 84; Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (Skillman, Supp. 1936) §§ 3254-(57, 79, So 95, ioo,
1O4, rii);
Iowa L. 1939, c. 90; Cal. Agric. Code (Deering, 1937) §§ 1300.5 (b-8), i3oo.17 (b).
Twenty-seven states have passed legislation authorizing annual expenditures to publicize their
general resources and "natural advantages." An excellent example of general state advertising
is afforded by the New England Council, which is supported by Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Vermont, and publishes the New England News
Letter.
23Floyd Fruit Co. v. Florida Citrus Com'n, 128 Fla. 565, 175 So. 248 (1937); State ex rel.
Graham v. Enking, 59 Idaho 321, 82 P. (2d) 649 (1938). No other test cases are reported.
'4 Although the apple growing industry ranked ninth among Michigan farm products for
1938, there is no doubt that the sale of apples has fallen off in the past several years. In 1899
the annual per capita consumption of all kinds of fruit in the United States was 141.9 pounds,
,o6 pounds of which were apples. In 1938 the per capita consumption of fruit was up to 177
pounds, only 56.8 pounds of which were apples. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, at 3, 4. To
combat this trend the state of Washington entered into the business of advertising its apples.
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 194o) § 2874. Much of the trend away from apples
may be attributed to the state advertising campaign of Florida (Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (Skillman, Supp. 1936) § 3254-(57, 79, o, 95, 100, 104, ixi)) and to the extensive advertising of California fruit carried on by the California Fruit Growers Exchange. See Annual Report of General Manager of California Fruit Growers Exchange 21 (1940).
25In passing upon this question the court's task was not to decide whether such a policy

would actually benefit the public, but was rather to ascertain whether there was a reasonable
likelihood that it would do so.
26The effect of efforts to establish a local market for a product by differentiating competing
products in the consumer's mind is not unlike the efforts to secure a special market for a local
product by imposing "market barriers" to the entry into the local market of competing
products produced elsewhere.
'7

See Simons, Positive Program for Laissez Faire 31-34 (1934), for a good analysis of the

wasteful results of such competition in the advertising area.
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gram. But until notions of what constitutes sound economic practice change, we may
expect at least as much, and perhaps more such legislation; moreover, it may be in a
more objectionable form. If present advertising schemes do not succeed in stimulating
demand, there is a danger that power to restrict production will be delegated to the
commissions in the hope that a "little more" regulation will bring about the hoped-for
rejuvenation. Since these commissions are ordinarily composed of the producers themselves, the end result may be a situation uncomfortably close to that in England where
regulations for the production and marketing of certain agricultural products are promulgated by boards elected by and responsible to the producers and are too frequently
designed to further private rather than public interests.28

Torts-Libel Per Se-Liability for False Designation of Attorney as Nazi and Communist-[New York].-In an open letter to the members of his union the defendant,
a local union official, charged that the plaintiff, an attorney, was a Nazi and a Communist. In the ensuing libel action the defendant sought to have the complaint dismissed on the ground that the words complained of were not libelous per se, and that
in New York an action on a defamatory publication which is not libelous per se must
be accompanied by an allegation of special damages. Held, that under present circumstances such a false allegation constitutes libel per se, and that therefore it was not
necessary to allege special damages. Levy v. Gelber.,
It is well known that the referents of particular words often vary from one time to
another,2 and that their connotations are not everywhere the same.3 Only six months
prior to the instant case a New York court dismissed an action for libel on the ground
that a charge that a plaintiff was a Communist4 did not tend to expose him to the contempt, hatred, or ridicule of a substantial portion of the community.s In England during the "Red scare" of the early 192o's, however, false charges of Communism were
held actionable.' Similarly in the reign of James I it was held that to term a person a
Papist and to say that he went to Mass did not give rise to an action for defamation;7
29 Astor and Rowntree, British Agriculture: The Principles of Future Policy 429-30 (1938).
X25 N.Y.S. (2d) 148 (S. Ct. 104).
2"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and
may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which
it is used." Holmes, J.,
in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1917). See Harrison v. Thornborough, ioMod. Rep. *196, *197 (Q.B. 1714).
3 "Words are not one-valued; they are often multivalued, and can take on as many meanings as there are concepts." Chase, The Tyranny of Words 3o9 (3938).
4 Garriga v. Richfield, 174 Misc. 315, 2o N.Y.S. (2d) 544 (S. Ct. i94o).
5 Gatley, Libel and Slander 14 (3 d ed. 1938); Harper, Torts § 243 (1933); Newell, Slander
and Libel 1-3 (4 th ed. 3924). The problem of "whose hatred" is answered broadly in Peck v.
Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (i909). The English view appears slightly narrower, requiring that
words must tend to lower plaintiff in estimation of right-thinking members of society generally.
Tolley v. Fry & Sons, Ltd., [i93o] i K. B. 467. A New York statute similarly defines criminal
libel. N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1938) c. 4o,§§ 3340, 3343.
6Burns v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 42 T.L.R. 37 (Ch. 1925). In 3938 Gatley suggested that the opposite result would be reached. Gatley, Libel and Slander 26 (3d ed. 3938).
7 Ireland v. Smith, 2 Brownl. 166 (C.P. 1612).

